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Abstract
One of the most striking aspects of the recent recession is the collapse in international trade. This
paper uses disaggregated quarterly and monthly data on U.S. imports and exports to shed light
on the anatomy of this collapse. We nd that the recent reduction in trade relative to overall
economic activity is far larger than in previous downturns. Information on quantities and prices
of both domestic absorption and imports reveals a more than 50% shortfall in imports, relative
to what would be predicted by a simple import demand relationship. In a sample of imports
and exports disaggregated at the 6-digit NAICS level, we nd that sectors used as intermediate
inputs experienced signicantly higher percentage reductions in both imports and exports. We
also nd support for compositional eects: sectors with larger reductions in domestic output
had larger drops in trade. By contrast, we nd no support for the hypothesis that trade credit
played a role in the recent trade collapse.
JEL Classications: F41, F42
Keywords: 2008-2009 Crisis, International Trade
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A remarkable feature of the recent crisis is the collapse in international trade. This collapse is
global in nature (WTO 2009), and dramatic in magnitude. To give one example, while the U.S.
GDP has so far declined by 3.9% from its peak, real U.S. imports fell by 18.6% and real exports
fell by 15.2% over the same period. Though protectionist pressures inevitably increased over the
course of the recent crisis, it is widely believed that the collapse is not due to newly erected trade
barriers (Baldwin and Evenett 2009).
While these broad facts are well known, we currently lack both a nuanced empirical under-
standing of the patterns and a successful economic explanation for them. This paper has three
main parts. In the rst, we use high-frequency (quarterly and monthly) foreign trade data for the
United States to document the patterns of collapse at a disaggregated level. We focus on the U.S.
in part due to its central role in the global downturn and because it oers up-to-date, detailed
monthly data. We rst use historical data to reveal whether the recent collapse in international
trade relative to the level of economic activity is exceptional by historical standards, or just an
amplied version of what has happened in earlier downturns. We then establish whether the re-
cent reduction in international trade is especially pronounced in certain sectors. For instance, are
intermediate inputs, investment, or consumption goods experiencing the largest drops? Durables
vs. nondurables? Goods or services? We also determine with which countries U.S. trade has fallen
the most. Is it with the closest trade partners, such as Canada and Mexico? With newly important
trade partners such as China, India, or Southeast Asian countries? With Europe, Latin America,
or Africa? Finally, we separate movements in prices and quantities, to examine whether the fall is
mainly real or nominal.
In the second part, use data on domestic absorption, sectoral price levels, as well as quantities
and prices of imports to perform a simple \trade wedge" exercise in the spirit of Cole and Oha-
nian (2002) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007). A model that features CES aggregation
of domestic and foreign varieties in a particular sector { that is, virtually any model in interna-
tional macroeconomics { has implications for the joint behavior of domestic absorption, domestic
prices, and import prices and quantities. Using this simple optimality condition allows us to ex-
plore two questions: rst, is the recent trade collapse truly a puzzle? That is, the wedge exercise
that accounts for both domestic and foreign prices and quantities is the appropriate benchmark to
evaluate whether the recent decrease in international trade is in any sense \extraordinary." Second,
by pitting against the data conditions that would have to hold period-by-period in virtually any
quantitative model of international transmission, we can oer a preliminary view on whether { and
which { DSGE models can have some hope of matching the magnitude of the recent collapse in
international trade.
1Finally, the third part uses monthly sector-level data to examine a range of potential explana-
tions for the trade collapse proposed in the policy literature. We record the percentage changes in
exports and imports during the recent crisis at the 6-digit NAICS level of disaggregation (about
450 distinct sectors). We then relate the variation in these changes to sectoral characteristics that
would proxy for the leading explanations. The rst is that trade may be collapsing because of the
transmission of shocks through vertical production linkages. When there is a drop in nal output,
the demand for intermediate inputs will suer, leading to a more than proportional drop in trade
ows.1 To test for this possibility, we build several measures of intermediate input linkages at
the detailed sector level based on the U.S. Input-Output tables, as well as measures of production
sharing based on data on exports and imports within multinational rms. The second explanation
we evaluate is trade credit: if during the recent crisis, rms in the U.S. are less willing to extend
trade credit to partners abroad, trade may be disrupted.2 We therefore use U.S. rm-level data
to construct measures of the intensity of trade credit use in each sector. Finally, the collapse in
trade could be due to compositional eects. That is, if international trade happens disproportion-
ately in sectors whose domestic absorption (or production) collapsed the most, that would explain
why trade fell more than GDP. Two special cases of the compositional story are investment goods
(Boileau 1999, Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust 2008) and durable goods (Engel and Wang 2009). Since
investment and durables consumption are several times more volatile than GDP, trade in invest-
ment and durable goods would be expected to experience larger swings than GDP as well. Thus, we
collect measures of domestic output at the most disaggregated available level, and check whether
international trade fell systematically more in sectors that also experienced the greatest reductions
in domestic output. In addition, we build an indicator for whether a sector produces durable goods.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. The recent collapse in international trade
is indeed exceptional by historical standards. Relative to economic activity, the drop in trade is
an order of magnitude larger than what was observed in the previous postwar recessions, with the
exception of 2001. The collapse appears to be broad-based across trading partners: trade with
virtually all parts of the world decreased by a similar order of magnitude. The sharpest percentage
drops in trade are in automobiles, durable industrial supplies and capital goods. Those categories
also account for most of the absolute decrease in trade as well.
Another way to assess whether the recent trade collapse is exceptional is to use information on
prices and examine the wedges. The time series behavior of the international trade wedge does
1Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) and Yi (2003) document the dramatic growth in vertical trade in recent decades,
and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) demonstrate that greater sector-level vertical linkages play a role in the
transmission of shocks between countries.
2Raddatz (2009) shows that there is greater comovement between sectors that have stronger trade credit links,
while Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) demonstrate that in countries experiencing banking crises, export fell systemati-
cally more in nancially dependent industries. Amiti and Weinstein (2009) show that exports by Japanese rms in
the 1990s declined when the bank commonly recognized as providing trade nance to the rm was in distress.
2reveal a drastic deviation from the norm during the recent episode. In the recent episode, the overall
trade wedge has reached  54%, revealing a collapse in trade well in excess of what is predicted by
the pace of economic activity and prices. This is indeed exceptional: over the past 25 years the
mean value of the wedge is less than 9%, with a standard deviation of 8.7%. We conclude from
this exercise that the recent trade collapse does represent a puzzle, in the sense that any import
demand function derived from CES aggregation would predict a far smaller drop in imports given
observed overall economic activity and prices.3
Finally, using detailed trade data, we shed light on which explanations are consistent with
cross-sectoral variation in trade ow changes. We nd some support for the vertical linkages view,
as well as for compositional eects. Sectors that are used intensively as intermediate inputs, and
those with greater reductions in domestic output experienced signicantly greater reductions in
trade, after controlling for a variety of other sectoral characteristics. By contrast, trade credit does
not appear to play a signicant role: more trade credit-intensive sectors did not experience greater
trade ow reductions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a set of stylized facts on the
recent trade collapse using detailed quarterly data on U.S. imports and exports. Section 3 describes
a framework to build the international trade wedges, and presents the behavior of those wedges
over time and in dierent sectors. Section 4 uses detailed data on sectoral characteristics to assess
whether the variation across sectors is consistent with the main explanations proposed in the policy
literature. Section 5 concludes.
2 Facts
This section uses disaggregated quarterly data on U.S. imports and exports to establish a number
of striking patterns in the data. We discuss three aspects of the recent episode: (i) its magnitude
relative to historical experience; (ii) the sector- and destination- level breakdown; and (iii) the
behavior of prices and quantities separately. The total imports, exports, and GDP data come from
the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The trade ows and prices disaggregated
by sector are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis' Trade in Goods and Services Database, while
trade ows disaggregated by partner are from the U.S. International Trade Commission's Taris
and Trade Database.
Fact 1 As a share of economic activity, the collapse in U.S. exports and imports in the recent
3Chinn (2009) estimates an econometric model of U.S. exports, and shows that the recent level of exports is
far below what would be predicted by the model. Freund (2009) analyzes the behavior of trade in previous global
downturns, and shows that the elasticity of trade to GDP has increased in recent decades, predicting a reduction
in global trade in the current downturn of about 15%. Our methodology looks at U.S. imports rather than U.S. or
global exports, and takes explicit account of domestic and import prices at the quarterly frequency.
3downturn is exceptional by historical standards. Only the 2001 recession is comparable.
Figure 1(a) plots quarterly values of imports and exports normalized by GDP over the past 62
years, along with the recession bars. Visually, the 2008-09 collapse appears larger than most
changes experienced in the past.4 It is also clear, however, that a similar drop occurred in 2001, a
fact that appears underappreciated. Table 1 reports the change in the ratios of imports and exports
to GDP during the 2008 and 2001 recessions, as well as the average changes in those variables during
the recessions that occurred between 1950 and 2000. For the 2008 and 2001 recessions, the total
declines are calculated both during the ocial NBER recession dates, and with respect to the peak
value of trade/GDP around the onset of the recession. It is apparent that both the imports and
exports to GDP decline by 14 to 30% during the last two recessions, depending on the measure.
By contrast, in all the pre-2000 recessions, the average decline in exports is less than 1 percentage
point, and the average change in imports is virtually nil. As an alternative way of presenting the
historical series, Figure 1(b) plots the deviations from trend in real imports, exports, and GDP
over the same period. To detrend the series, we use the Hodrick-Prescott lter with the standard
parameter of 1600. The recent period is characterized by large negative deviations from trend for
both imports and exports. We can see that these are greater in magnitude than the deviation from
trend in GDP.
Fact 2 For both U.S. exports and imports, the sharpest percentage drops are in the automotive
and industrial supplies sectors, with consumer goods trade experiencing a far smaller percentage
decrease. For imports, the decrease in petroleum category alone accounts for one third of the total
decline.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the reductions in exports and imports by sector for the recent trade
collapse. While the overall reduction in nominal exports is about 26%, exports in the automotive
sector (which comprises both vehicles and parts) drop by 47%, and in industrial supplies by 34%.
By contrast, exports of consumer goods ( 12%), agricultural output ( 19%), and capital goods
( 20%) experience less than average percentage reductions. The table also reports the share of
each of these sectors in total exports at the outset of the crisis, as well as the absolute reductions
in trade. It is clear that industrial supplies and automotive sectors accounted for almost 40% of all
U.S. goods exports, and their combined decrease accounts for more than half of the total collapse
of U.S. exports.
Total imports decline by 34%. The petroleum and products category has the largest percentage
decrease at  54%. It also accounts for some 20% of the pre-crisis imports, and about 1/3 of the
4The concurrent change in the exchange rate is relatively subdued. Appendix Figure A1 plots the long-run path
of the nominal and real eective exchange rates for the United States. Over the period coinciding with the trade
collapse, the U.S. dollar appreciated slightly in real terms, but the change has been less than 10%.
4total absolute decline. As with exports, the next largest percentage declines are in the automotive
( 49%) and industrial supplies ( 47%) sectors. By contrast, consumer goods decrease by only
15%, and agricultural products by 9%.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the collapse in real trade over time. Figure 2 displays the trade in
real goods and services separately. We can see that goods trade is both larger in volume, and the
decrease is more pronounced than in services. Figure 3 breaks total goods trade into real durables
and non-durables, to highlight that the reduction in the trade categories considered durable is more
pronounced, for both imports and exports. These gures indicate that in order to understand the
collapse in real trade ows, it is reasonable to focus on goods trade and examine durable goods
more closely. We follow this strategy in Sections 3 and 4.
Fact 3 The recent collapse in U.S. foreign trade is roughly similar in magnitude across all major
U.S. trading partners.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the reduction, in absolute and percentage terms, of exports and imports
to and from the main regions of the world and the most important individual partners within those
regions. To be precise, the rst three columns, under \Exports," report the exports from the U.S.
to the various countries and regions. Correspondingly, the columns labeled \Imports" report the
imports to the U.S. from these countries. What is remarkable is how broad-based the collapse is.
With virtually every major partner, U.S. exports are dropping by more than 20% (with China and
India being the notable exceptions), while imports are dropping by 30% or more (with once again
China as the exception at  16%).
Fact 4 Both quantities and prices of exports and imports decreased, with changes in real quantities
explaining the majority of the nominal decrease in trade.
Figure 4 plots both nominal and real trade, each normalized to its 2005q1 value. While nominal
exports fall by 26% from its peak, the fall in real exports accounts for about three quarters of that
decline, 19%. For imports, the role of declining import prices is greater. In addition, the peak
in real imports occurred 3 quarters earlier than the peak of nominal imports, due largely to the
timing of the oil price collapse. Nonetheless, real quantities account for about 60% of the total
nominal decline in imports. Table 3 presents the nominal, real, and price level changes in each
export and import category. It is remarkable that in some important sectors, such as automotive,
capital goods, and consumer goods, the prices did not move much at all, and the entire decline in
nominal exports and imports is accounted for by real quantities. By contrast, prices moved the
most in industrial supplies, especially petroleum. Figure 5 presents the contrast between nominal
and real graphically. It plots the nominal declines in each sector against the real ones, along with
the 45-degree line. For points on the 45-degree line, all of the nominal decrease in trade is accounted
5for by movements in real quantities, with no change in prices. For points farther from the line, price
changes account for more of the nominal change in trade. There are several things to take away
from this gure. First, we can see that some important sectors are at or very near the 45-degree
line: all of the change in nominal trade in those sectors comes from quantities. Second, petroleum
imports is by far the biggest exception, as the only sector in which most of the change comes from
prices. Finally, in most cases import and export prices experienced a drop { the bulk of the points
are below the 45-degree line. This implies that in the recent episode, trade prices and quantities
are moving in the same direction.
3 Wedges
The discussion of nominal and real quantities foreshadows the exercise in this section. In particular,
we ask, is there any way to assess whether the trade changes during the recent crisis are in some
sense \exceptional" or \abnormal"? That is, how would we expect trade ows to behave in the
recent recession? To provide a model-based benchmark for the behavior of trade ows, we follow
the \wedge" methodology of Cole and Ohanian (2002) and Chari et al. (2007). We set down an
import demand equation that would be true in virtually any International Real Business Cycle
(IRBC) model, and check how the deviation from this condition, which we call the \trade wedge"
behaves in the recent crisis relative to historical experience.
Let us begin with the simplest 2-good IRBC model of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995).
There are two countries, Home and Foreign, and two intermediate goods, one produced in Home,
the other in Foreign. There is one nal good, used for both consumption and investment. The
resource constraint of the Home country in each period is given by:





















where Ct is Home consumption, It is Home investment, yh
t is the output of the Home intermediate
good that is used in Home production, and y
f
t is the amount of the Foreign intermediate used in
Home production. In this standard formulation, consumption and investment are perfect substi-
tutes, and Home and Foreign goods are aggregated in a CES production function. The parameter
! allows for a home bias in preferences.
The household (or, equivalently, a perfectly competitive nal goods producer), chooses the mix





































t is the price of the domestically-produced good and p
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t is the price of the imported good,



































Log-linearizing these, we obtain the following relationship in log changes, denoted by a caret:
b yf = "

b P   b pf

+ \ (C + I): (2)
This equation provides a benchmark for evaluating whether the recent trade collapse represents
a large deviation from business as usual. They will hold exactly in any model that features the
relationship of the type given by (1), a quite common one in the IRBC literature. Economically,
it ties real import demand to (i) overall real domestic absorption (C + I); (ii) the overall domestic
price level (P); and (iii) import prices pf. Since all of these are observable, we proceed by using
equation (2) to compute the log deviation from it holding exactly, calling it the \trade wedge."
On the left-hand side is the log change in real imports. The term \ (C + I) is captured by the log
change in the sum of real consumption and real investment in the national accounts data; b P is
the change in the GDP deator,5 and b pf is the change in the import price deator. We must also
choose a value of the elasticity of substitution ". We report results for two values: " = 1:5, which
is the \classic" IRBC value of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
(Backus et al. 1995); and " = 6, which is a common value in the trade literature (Anderson and
van Wincoop 2004).6
5We also constructed a price index for just consumption and investment based on the consumption and investment
prices in the National Income and Product Accounts, and used that instead of the GDP deator. The results were
virtually unchanged.
6Throughout this section, we assume that the taste parameter ! is not changing. If ! is thought of as a taste shock
7We use quarterly data and compute year-to-year log changes in each variable. Column 1 in
Table 4 presents the current value of the year-to-year wedge (in this case, the wedge computed
2009q2 relative to 2008q2) for the two elasticities. The wedge is indeed quite large, at  54% for
the more conservative choice of ". The negative value indicates, not surprisingly, that imports fell
by 54% more than overall U.S. domestic demand and price movements would predict. To get a
sense whether the current level of the wedge is out of the ordinary, Figure 6 plots the quarterly
values of the year-on-year wedge for the period 1968 to the present. The recent period is indeed
exceptional. Over the entire sample period going back to 1968, the long-run average of the wedge is
actually slightly positive, at 9.5%, with a standard deviation of 11.5%.7 After 1984 { a year widely
considered to be a structural break, also evident in Figure 6 { the average wedge is 8.5%, with a
standard deviation of 8.7%. Thus, the current value of the wedge is 7 standard deviations away
from the mean, and 6 standard deviations away from zero, when compared to the post-1984 period.
Note that a more muted instance of the \collapse in the wedge" occurred in the 2001 recession.
However, in that episode the wedge reached  20%, well short of the current value.8
We can also determine whether price or quantity movements make up the bulk of the current
wedge. Real imports (the left-hand side of equation 2) fell by 21%, while the total nal demand
\ (C + I) fell by 6.7%. This implies that in the absence of any relative price movements, the wedge
would have been about  14%. The price movements conditioned by the elasticity of substitution
make up the rest of the dierence: the GDP deator went up by 1.5%, while import prices actually
fell by 16%.
3.1 Durable Goods
Beyond the simple structure of the canonical IRBC model, this methodology can be applied to con-
struct a wedge for any sector that would be modeled as a CES aggregate of domestic and foreign
varieties. The key data limitation that prevents the construction of wedges for disaggregated indus-
in the demand for foreign goods, an alternative interpretation of the wedge would be that it reveals what this taste
shock must be in each period to satisfy the rst-order condition for import demand perfectly. In the IRBC literature,
the parameter ! is sometimes thought of as a trade cost, and its value calibrated to the observed share of imports
to GDP. Under this interpretation, it may be that during this crisis trade costs went up, thereby lowering imports.
While we do not have comprehensive data on total trade costs at high frequencies, anecdotal evidence suggests that if
anything shipping costs decreased dramatically in the course of the recent crisis, due in part to the oil price collapse
(Economist 2009). Thus, taking explicit account of shipping costs would make the wedge even larger.
7We conjecture that the positive long-run average value over this period may reect a secular reduction in trade
costs, which we do not incorporate explicitly into our exercise.
8In the baseline analysis we compute the wedges based on log changes over time { in our case, year-on-year changes
in quarterly data. An alternative would be to compute them based on deviations from trend in each variable. To do
this, we HP-detrended each series, and built a wedge using equation (2) such that the caret means the log deviation
from trend. This procedure yields qualitatively similar results. In 2009q2 the overall wedge stands at  24%. This
is considerably smaller in magnitude than the baseline value we report. However, it is still quite exceptional by
historical standards. In the post-1984 period, the standard deviation of the deviation-from-trend wedge is 4.3%, and
its mean is zero. This implies that the value of 2009q2 wedge is 5.6 standard deviations away from the historical
average.
8tries is the availability of domestic absorption and price levels at the detailed level. We can make
progress, however, for one important sector: durable goods. Engel and Wang (2009) demonstrate
that both imports and exports are about 3 times more volatile than GDP in OECD countries, and
propose a compositional explanation. It is well known that durable goods consumption is more
volatile than overall consumption, and that much of international trade is in durable goods. Putting
the two together provides a reason for why trade is more volatile than GDP: it is composed of the
more volatile durables. This hypothesis can be extended to apply to the recent crisis. It may be
that imports and exports fell so much relative to GDP because their composition is dierent from
the composition of GDP.
The wedges methodology can be used to shed light on the potential for this explanation to
work. If the reason for the fall in trade is compositional, then the wedges should disappear (or at
least get smaller) when we compute them on the durable goods separately. In particular, suppose




















t is the domestic durable variety consumed in Home, and d
f
t is the Foreign durable variety
consumed in Home. In other words, a \nal durable goods" producer aggregates domestically-
produced durable intermediates with foreign-produced durable intermediates to create a durable
good that can be used either as purchases of new durable consumption goods or capital investment.9
By standard CES cost minimization, the \durable trade wedge" has the familiar form:
b df = "






where, as above, PD is the domestic price level of the durable spending, and p
f
D is the price of
the foreign durables. To construct the durable wedge, we use the BEA denition of durable goods
imports.10 Using sector-level price and quantity import data, we construct the log change in real
durable imports b df and in the prices of durable imports b p
f
D. To proxy for real durable demand b D we
combine domestic spending on consumer durables and xed investment, building the corresponding
9This formulation may appear to sidestep the special feature of durable goods, namely that it is the stock of
durables that enters utility. In our formulation, equation (3) denes the ow of new durable goods, rather than the
stock. Our assumption is then that the ow of new durable goods is a CES aggregate of the ows of foreign and




t . We can then dene the stock of durables by its evolution Dt = (1 )Dt 1+Dt,
with the stock Dt entering the utility function. An alternative assumption would be that foreign and domestic durables
have separate stocks, and consumer utility depends on a CES aggregate of domestic and foreign durable stocks (this
is the assumption adopted by Engel and Wang 2009). A priori, we nd no economic reason to favor one set of
assumptions over the other, while our formulation is much more amenable to analyzing prices and quantities jointly.
This is because statistical agencies record quantities and prices of purchases, which are ows.
10This roughly corresponds to the sum of capital goods; automotive vehicles, engines, and parts; consumer durables;
and durable industrial supplies and materials.
9domestic durable price level.11
The second column of Table 4 reports the current (2009q2) value of the year-to-year wedge.
It is clear that the durable wedge is just as pronounced as the overall wedge: for " = 1:5, it
stands at  57%. Thus, the trade collapse puzzle persists even when we consider the durable sector
exclusively, suggesting that the compositional explanation relying on durables trade is not likely to
fully account for the recent episode. Note that the level of the durable wedge is also exceptional
by historical standards, as Figure 6 demonstrates. The durable wedge actually tracks the overall
wedge quite closely, albeit with a slightly higher mean (12% post-1984), and standard deviation
(11.5%). The contribution of the real quantities to the current level of the wedge is also similar
to the overall wedge. Real durable imports fell by 34%, while the real durable domestic spending
fell by 18%. This implies that in the complete absence of relative price movements, the \quantity
wedge" would be about 16%. The rest of the wedge comes from relative prices.
3.2 Final Goods
We can make progress in shedding light on the compositional explanations in another way. It may
be that equation (1) is not a good description of the production structure of the economy. One
immediate possibility is that consumption and investment goods are very dierent. Indeed, Section
2 shows that consumption and capital goods experienced dierent price and quantity movements.
We can glean further where the data diverge from the model by positing a production structure in
which investment and consumption goods are dierent, but both are produced from domestic and











































In this formulation, domestic consumption goods cd
t are dierent from domestic investment
goods id
t, and the same holds for the foreign consumption and investment goods. Note that we
allow home bias and the elasticity of substitution to be dierent for the consumption and investment
sectors. Going through the same cost minimization calculation, we obtain the import demands for
consumption and investment goods expressed in log changes:
b cf = "






b if = 






11Our calculation includes in b D structures and residential investment in addition to machinery and equipment.
This inclusion tends to make the durable wedge smaller, as real estate prices fell more than overall investment goods
prices, shrinking the price component of the durable wedge.
10These equations now relate the real reduction in consumption goods imports to the overall domestic
real consumption, the consumption price index, and the price index of imported consumption goods,
and same for investment. Provided that we have data on all of these prices and quantities, we can
calculate the \consumption trade wedge" and the \investment trade wedge," and determine which
one reveals greater deviations from the theoretical benchmark.
To construct these, we isolate imports of consumer goods (about 20% of total U.S. imports
at the outset of the crisis), and compute the real change in consumer goods imports b cf, and the
corresponding import price change b p
f
C. We then match these up to the change in real consumption
expenditures on goods b C, and the domestic consumption price index. Column 3 of Table 4 reports
the results. The consumption wedge is much smaller, at  6:2%. Figure 7 displays the time path
of the year-on-year consumption wedge since 1968. It is clear that the recent episode is completely
unexceptional if we conne our attention to consumer goods trade. Historically, the consumption
wedge is closer to zero, with a post-1984 mean of 4.5% and a standard deviation of 5.5%.
To construct the investment trade wedge, we isolate imports of capital goods (also about 20% of
U.S. imports at the outset of the crisis), and match them up with investment data in the National
Accounts. Column 4 of Table 4 presents the results. The investment wedge is also quite small,
at  10%. As Figure 7 shows, it is unexceptional by historical standards: the mean investment
wedge post-1984 is 2%, with a standard deviation of 9.3%. This implies that the current level of
the investment wedge is about one standard deviation away from the historical mean, or from the
model implied value of zero.
These results tell us that the puzzle in the recent trade collapse is not in nal goods, be it
consumption or investment. Instead, the discrepancy between the large overall wedge and the
small consumption and investment wedges appears to be in the intermediate goods sectors, and
these partially overlap with durable goods. This suggests that modeling exercises that focus on
movements in the nal domestic demand are unlikely to match the data well. Instead, explanations
that focus on trade in intermediates appear potentially more fruitful.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we investigate whether the patterns of trade collapse at the detailed industry level
are consistent with a variety of explanations proposed in the policy debate. In order to carry out
empirical analysis, we collect monthly nominal data for U.S. imports and exports vis- a-vis the rest
of the world at the NAICS 6-digit level of disaggregation from the USITC. This the most nely
disaggregated NAICS trade data available at the monthly frequency, yielding about 450 distinct
sectors. For each sector, we compute the percentage drop in trade ows over the course of a year
11ending in June 2009 (most recent available data), and estimate the following specication:
trade
i = 0 + 1CHARi +   Xi + i:
In this estimating equation i indexes sectors, trade
i is the percentage change in the trade ow, which
can be exports or imports, and CHARi is the sector-level variable meant to capture a particular
explanation proposed in the literature.12 We include a vector of controls Xi in each specication.
Our strategy is to exploit variation in sectoral characteristics to evaluate three main hypotheses:
vertical production linkages, trade credit, and compositional eects/durables demand. We now
describe each of them in turn.
The vertical linkages view, most often associated with Yi (2003), suggests that since much of
international trade is in intermediate inputs, and intermediates at dierent stages of processing
often cross borders multiple times, a drop in nal consumption demand associated with the re-
cession will decrease cross-border trade in intermediate goods. This can matter for the business
cycle: di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) show that trade in intermediate inputs leads to higher
comovement between countries, both at sectoral and aggregate levels. The simplest way to test
the vertical linkage hypothesis is to classify goods according to the intensity with which they are
used as intermediate inputs. We start with the 2002 benchmark version of the detailed U.S. Input-
Output matrix available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and construct our measures using
the Direct Requirements Table. The (i;j)th cell in the Direct Requirements Table records the
amount of a commodity in row i required to produce one dollar of nal output in column j. By
construction, no cell in the Total Requirements Table can take on values greater than 1. To build
an indicator of \downstream vertical linkages," we record the average use of a commodity in row
i in all downstream industries j: the average of the elements across all columns in row i. This
measure gives the average amount of good i required to produce one dollar worth of output across
all the possible nal output sectors. In other words, it is the intensity with which good i is used as
an intermediate input by other sectors.
We build two additional indicators of downstream vertical linkages: the simple number of sectors
that use input i as an intermediate, and the Herndahl index of downstream intermediate use. The
former is computed by simply counting the number of industries for which the use of intermediate
input i is positive. The latter is an index of diversity with which dierent sectors use good i: it
will take the maximum value of 1 when only one sector uses good i as an input, and will take the
minimum value when all sectors use input i with the same intensity.
12The change in trade is computed using the total values of exports and imports in each sector, implying that it is a
nominal change. As an alternative, we used import price data from the BLS at the most disaggregated available level
to deate the nominal ows. The shortcoming of this approach is that the import price indices are only available at
a more coarse level of aggregation (about 4-digit NAICS). This implies that multiple 6-digit trade ows are deated
using the same price index, potentially introducing measurement error. Nonetheless, the main results were unchanged.
12A related type of the vertical linkage story is the \disorganization" hypothesis (Kremer 1993,
Blanchard and Kremer 1997). In a production economy where intermediate inputs are essential,
following a disruption such as the nancial crisis, shocks to even a small set of intermediate inputs
can create a large drop in output. For instance, Blanchard and Kremer (1997) document that
during the collapse of the Soviet Union, output in more complex industries { those that use a greater
number of intermediate inputs { fell by more than output in less complex ones. This view suggests
that we should construct measures of \upstream vertical linkages," that would capture the intensity
and the pattern of intermediate good use by industry (in column) j. The three indices we construct
parallel the downstream measures described above. We record the intensity of intermediate good
use by industry j as total spending on intermediates per dollar of nal output. We also measure
an industry's complexity in two ways: by counting the total number of intermediate inputs used
by industry j, and by computing the Herndahl index of intermediate use shares in industry j.13
Burstein, Kurz and Tesar (2008) propose another version of the vertical linkage hypothesis.
They argue that it is not trade in intermediate inputs per se, but how production is organized.
Under \production sharing," inputs are customized and the factory in one country depends crucially
on output from a particular factory in another country. In eect, inputs produced on dierent sides
of the border become essential, and a shock to one severely reduces the output of the other. To
build indicators of production sharing, we follow Burstein et al. (2008) and use data on shipments
by multinationals from the BEA. In particular, we record imports from foreign aliates by their
U.S. parent plus imports from a foreign parent company by its U.S. aliate as a share of total U.S.
imports in a sector. Similarly, we record exports to the foreign aliate from their U.S. parents
plus exports to a foreign parent from a U.S. aliate as a share of total U.S. exports. In eect,
these measures of production sharing are measures of intra-rm trade relative to total trade in a
sector. We use the BEA multinational data at the nest level of disaggregation that is publicly
available, which is about 2 or 3 digit NAICS, and take the average over the period 2002-2006 (the
latest available years).
The second suggested explanation for the collapse in international trade is a contraction in
trade credit (see, e.g., Auboin 2009, IMF 2009). Under this view, international trade is being
disrupted because the domestic companies that are buying imports are no longer extending trade
credit to their foreign counterparties. Without trade credit, foreign rms are unable to produce and
imports do not take place. Indeed, there is some evidence that sectors more closely linked by trade
credit relationships experience greater comovement (Raddatz 2009). To test this hypothesis, we
used Compustat data to build standard measures of trade credit by industry. The rst is accounts
payable/cost of goods sold. This variable records the amount of credit that is extended to the
rm by suppliers, relative to the cost of production. The second is accounts receivable/sales. This
13For more on these product complexity measures, see Cowan and Neut (2007) and Levchenko (2007).
13is a measure of how much the rm is extending credit to its customers. These are the two most
standard indices in the trade credit literature (see, e.g., Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende 2007). To
construct them, we obtain quarterly data on all rms in Compustat from 2000 to 2008, compute
these ratios for each rm in each quarter, and then take the median value for each rm across all
the quarters for which data are available. We then take the median of this value across rms in
each industry.14 Since coverage is uneven across sectors, we ensure that we have at least 10 rms
over which we calculate trade credit intensity. This implies that sometimes the level of variation
is at the 5-, 4-, and even 3-digit level, though the trade data are at the 6-digit NAICS level of
disaggregation.15
Finally, another explanation for the collapse of international trade has to do with composition. It
may be that trade fell by more than GDP simply because international trade occurs systematically
in sectors that fell more than overall GDP. A way to evaluate this explanation would be to control
for domestic absorption in each sector. While we do not have domestic absorption data, especially
at this level of aggregation, we instead proxy for it using industrial production indices. These
indices are compiled by the Federal Reserve, and are available monthly at about the 4-digit NAICS
level of disaggregation. They are not measured in the same units as import and export data,
since industrial production is an index number. Our dependent variables, however, are percentage
reductions in imports and exports, thus we can control for the percentage reduction in industrial
production to measure the compositional eect. Two special cases of the compositional channel are
due to Boileau (1999), Erceg et al. (2008), and Engel and Wang (2009). These authors point out
that a large share of U.S. trade is in investment and durable goods, which tend to be more volatile
than other components of GDP. In order to explore this possibility, we classify goods according to
whether they are durable or not, and examine whether durable exports indeed fell by more than
nondurable ones.16
We use several controls in the baseline estimation. To control for sector size, we include each
industry's share in total imports (resp. exports) over the period 2002-2007, the elasticity of substi-
tution between varieties in a sector from Broda and Weinstein (2006), as well as labor intensity com-
puted from the U.S. Input-Output table. These are indicators available for both non-manufacturing
and manufacturing industries. To check robustness, we also control for skill and capital intensity
14We take medians to reduce the impact of outliers, which tend to be large in rm-level data. Taking the means
instead leaves the results unchanged.
15Amiti and Weinstein (2009) emphasize that trade credit in the accounting sense and trade nance are distinct.
Trade credit refers to payments owed to rms, while trade nance refers to short-term loans and guarantees used to
cover international transactions. We are not aware of any reliable sector-level measures of trade nance used by U.S.
rms engaged in international trade.
16We created a very rough classication of durables at the 3-digit NAICS level. Durable sectors include 23X
(construction) and 325-339 (chemical, plastics, mineral, metal, machinery, computer/electronic, transportation, and
miscellaneous manufacturing). All other 1XX, 2XX, and 3XX NAICS categories are considered non-durable for this
exercise.
14sourced from the NBER productivity database, and the level of inventories from the BEA, which
are unfortunately only available for manufacturing industries. Appendix Table A1 reports the
summary statistics for all the dependent and independent variables used in estimation.
4.1 Vertical Linkages
Table 5 describes the results of testing for the role of downstream vertical linkages in the reduction
in trade. In this and all other tables, the dependent variable is the percentage reduction in imports
(Panel A) or exports (Panel B) from June 2008 to June 2009.17 There is evidence that downstream
linkages play a role in the reduction in international trade, especially for imports into the United
States. Goods that are used intensely as intermediates (\Average Downstream Use") experienced
larger percentage drops in imports and exports. In addition, other proxies such as the number of
sectors that use an industry as an intermediate input as well as the Herndahl index of downstream
intermediate use, are signicant for imports, though not for exports. On the other hand, there is
no evidence that measures of production sharing based on trade within the multinational rms are
signicantly correlated with a drop in international trade. Table 6 examines instead the role of
upstream vertical linkages, with more mixed results. While some of the measures are signicant for
either imports or exports, and all have the expected signs, there is no robust pattern of signicance.
4.2 Trade Credit
Table 7 examines the hypothesis that trade credit played a role in the collapse of international trade.
In particular, it tests for whether imports and exports experienced greater percentage reductions
in industries that use trade credit intensively. As above, Panel A reports the results for imports,
and Panel B for exports. There appears to be no evidence that sectors that either use, or extend,
trade credit more intensively exhibited larger changes in trade ows.
We can also examine the time evolution of trade credit directly. The Compustat database con-
tains information on accounts payable up to and including the rst quarter of 2009 for a substantial
number of rms. While there are between 7,000 and 8,000 rms per quarter with accounts payable
data in the Compustat database over the period 2007-2008, there are 6,250 rms for which this
variable is available for 2009q1. While this does represent a drop-o in coverage that may be non-
random, it is still informative to look at what happens to trade credit for those rms over time.
With this selection caveat in mind, we construct a panel of rms over 2000-2009q1 for which data
are available at the end of the period, and trace out the evolution of accounts payable as a share
of cost of goods sold. The median value of this variable across rms in each period is plotted in
17The peak of both total nominal imports and total nominal exports in the recent crisis is August 2008. An
alternative dependent variable would be the percentage drop from the peak to the present. However, that measure is
more noisy because of seasonality. Therefore, we consider a year-on-year reduction, sidestepping seasonal adjustment
issues.
15Figure 8(a). The dashed line represents the raw series. There is substantial seasonality in the raw
series, so the solid black line reports it after seasonal adjustment. The horizontal line plots the
mean value of this variable over the entire period.18 There is indeed a contraction in trade credit
during the recent crisis, but its magnitude is very small. The 2009q1 value of this variable is 55.2%,
just 1.3% below the period average of 56.5%, and only 3 percentage points below the most recent
peak of 58.1% in 2007q4. We conclude from this that the typical rm in Compustat experienced
at most a small contraction in trade credit it receives from other rms.19
Figure 8(b) presents the median of the other trade credit indicator, accounts receivable/sales
over the period 2004q1-2009q1. The coverage for this variable is not as good: there are very few
rms that report it before 2004, and there are only around 6,000 observations per quarter in 2007-
2008. In 2009q1, there are 4,967 rms that report this variable, and we use this sample of rms
to construct the time series for the median accounts receivable. Once again, the decrease during
the recent crisis is very small: the 2009q1 value of 56.3% is only 1 percentage point below the
period average of 57.3%, and just 2 percentage points below the 2007q4 peak of 58.5%. Indirectly,
accounts receivable may be a better measure of the trade credit conditions faced by the typical rm
in the economy, as it measures the credit extended by big Compustat rms to (presumably) smaller
counterparts. But the picture that emerges from looking at the two series is quite consistent: there
is at most a small reduction in trade credit during the recent downturn.
4.3 Composition
Finally, Table 8 tackles the issue of composition and durability. There appears to be robust evidence
that compositional eects play a role. Both exports and imports tend to collapse more in industries
where industrial production contracted more. In addition, the simple durable 0/1 dummy variable is
highly signicant, implying that on average imports in durable sectors contracted by 7.2 percentage
points more than non-durable ones, and exports in durable sectors contracted by 5.5 percentage
points more.
There is an alternative way to examine how much composition matters. We can compare
the data on percentage reductions in exports and imports with data on industrial production at
sector level. According to the compositional explanation, imports and exports will drop relative to
the level of overall economic activity if international trade ows are systematically biased towards
18It is suggestive from examining the raw data that there is no time trend in this variable. We conrm this by
regressing it on a time trend: the coecient on the time trend turns out to be very close to zero, and not statistically
signicant.
19It may be that while the impact on the median rm is small, there is still a large aggregate eect due to an uneven
distribution of trade credit across rms. To check for this possibility, we built the aggregate accounts payable/cost
of goods sold series, by computing the ratio of total accounts payable for all the rms to the sum of all cost of goods
sold for the same rms. The results from using this series are even more stark: it shows an increase during the crisis,
and its 2009q1 value actually stands above its long-run average.
16sectors in which domestic absorption fell the most. Composition will account for all of the reduction
in imports and exports relative to economic activity if at sector level, reductions in trade perfectly
matched reductions in domestic absorption, and all that was dierent between international trade
and economic activity was the shares going to each sector. By contrast, composition will account for
none of the reduction in trade relative to output if there are no systematic dierences in the trade
shares relative to output shares, at least along the volatility dimension. Alternatively, composition
will not explain the drop in trade if imports and exports simply experienced larger drops within
each sector than did total absorption.
With this logic in mind, we construct a hypothetical reduction in total trade that is implied







In this expression, i = 1;:::;I indexes sectors, atrade
i is the initial share of sector i in the total trade
ows, and IP
i is the percentage change in industrial production over the period of interest. That
is, ~ trade is the percentage reduction in overall trade that would occur if in each sector, trade was
reduced by exactly as much as industrial production. Following the rest of the empirical exercise
in this section, we compute IP
i over the period from June 2008 to June 2009, and apply the trade
shares atrade
i as they were in June 2008.
Table 9 reports the results. For both imports and exports, the rst column reports the percent-
age change in nominal trade, the second column the percentage change in real trade, and the third
column reports ~ trade, the hypothetical reduction in trade that would occur if in each sector, trade
fell by exactly as much as industrial production. Because trade data are available for a greater
range of sectors than industrial production data, the last column reports the share of total U.S.
trade ows that can be matched to industrial production. We can see that we can match 88% of
exports and 94% of imports to sectors with IP data. Nonetheless, the fact that this table does not
capture all trade ows explains the dierence between the values reported there and in Table 2. For
ease of comparison, the last line of the table reports the percentage change in the total industrial
production. By construction, the actual and implied values are identical.
We can see that industrial production fell by 13.4%, while the matching nominal imports and
exports fell by 33% and 35%, respectively. Comparing the actual changes in nominal trade to the
implied ones in column 3, we can see that composition explains about half: the implied reduction in
exports is 17.6%, and the implied reduction in imports 16.4%. As expected, both of these are larger
than the reduction in industrial production itself, so it is true that trade is systematically biased
towards sectors with larger reductions in domestic output. The real reductions in trade (column 2)
are smaller, as we saw above. Thus, the compositional eect accounts for about two-thirds of the
real reduction in exports, and almost the entire reduction in real imports.
17We conclude from this exercise that compositional eects are an important part of the story:
depending on the measure used, they account for between 50% and almost 100% of the actual drop
in trade ows. Several caveats are of course in order to interpret the results. First and foremost,
this is an accounting exercise rather than an economic explanation. We do not know why trade
ows are systematically biased towards sectors that experienced larger output reductions, nor do
we have a good sense of why some sectors experienced larger output drops than others.20 It also
does not explain why the trade collapse during this recession is so dierent from most previous
recessions. And second, industrial production may not be an entirely appropriate benchmark,
since it captures domestic output, while a more conceptually correct measure would be domestic
absorption. Nonetheless, our exercise does provide suggestive evidence of compositional eects.
To combine the above results together, Table 10 reports specications in which all the distinct
explanations are included together. The rst column presents results for all sectors and the baseline
set of control variables. The second column reports the results for manufacturing sectors only,
which allows us to include additional controls such as capital and skill intensity. The bottom
line is essentially unchanged: both downstream linkages and compositional eects are signicant
for imports, while upstream linkages and trade credit are not. For exports, compositional eects
continue to matter, while evidence on other channels is inconclusive.
In the subsample of the manufacturing sectors in columns 2 and 4, we also control for inventories.
We use monthly inventory data for 3-digit NAICS sectors from the BEA. Unfortunately, this coarse
level of aggregation implies that we only have 20 distinct sectors for which we can record inventory
levels. The particular variable we use is the ratio of inventories to imports (resp., exports) at the
beginning of the period, June 2008.21 The initial level of inventories is signicant, but its inclusion
leaves the rest of the results unchanged. In addition, it appears to have the \wrong" sign: sectors
with larger initial inventories had smaller reductions in imports, all else equal. These estimates are
not supportive of the hypothesis that imports collapsed partly because agents decided to deplete
inventories as a substitute to buying more from abroad.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses highly disaggregated monthly data on U.S. imports and exports to examine the
anatomy of the recent collapse in international trade. We show that this collapse is exceptional in
20Indeed, benchmarking the trade drop to the drop in industrial production leaves open the question of why the
reduction in industrial production itself is so much larger than in GDP: while total GDP contracted by 4% in the
recent episode, industrial production fell by 13.4%.
21Alternatively, we used the average level of inventories to imports (resp., exports) over the longer period, 2001-2007,
and the results were unchanged. We also used the percentage change in inventories that happened contemporaneously
with the reduction in trade, and the coecient was insignicant: it appears that there is no relationship between
changes in inventories and changes in trade ows over this period.
18two ways: it is far larger relative to economic activity than what has been observed in previous
U.S. downturns; and it is far larger than what would be predicted by the evolution of domestic
absorption and prices over the same period. Clearly, the behavior of international trade over this
period is evidence of a widespread disruption. Cross-sectional patterns of declines are consistent
with vertical specialization and compositional eects as (at least partial) explanations for the
collapse. By contrast, we do not detect any impact of trade credit on the reduction in international
trade.
An important next step in this research agenda is to develop a theoretical framework that can
be quantitatively successful at replicating this collapse in trade. Doing so will enable us to use this
episode as a laboratory to distinguish between the dierent models of international transmission.
Our hope is that the empirical results in this paper can oer some guidance as to which channels
are likely to be most promising.
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Notes: This table reports the percent reductions in Exports/GDP and Imports/GDP during the 2008 and
2001 recessions and the average for all the downturns from 1950 to 2000. Column \Recession" reports the
change in the trade variables during the ocial NBER recession (2007-2009 recession to date). Column
\From Peak" reports the change from the peak of the trade ratios to the trough (for 2001), and to date





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 4. Trade Wedges
" Overall Durable Consumption Investment
1.5 -0.536 -0.5706 -0.062 -0.102
6 -1.327 -0.710 0.075 -0.203
Notes: This table reports the wedges calculated for 2009q2 with respect to 2008q2 (year-on-year). Source:
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 9. Compositional Eects: Change in Trade Flows as Implied by Industrial Production.





Exports -34.5% -24.7% -17.6% 0.88
Imports -32.9% -17.6% -16.4% 0.94
IP -13.4% -13.4% 1.00
Notes: Changes in nominal and real exports over 2008m6 to 2009m6 for NAICS sectors where industrial
production (IP) data are available. Weights calculated from share of nominal trade and used to generate
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1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Imports
Exports GDP
(b) Imports, Exports, and GDP in Deviations from Trend
Notes: The top panel plots the ratios of imports/GDP and exports/GDP for the U.S., along with the NBER
recession bars. The bottom panel plots total imports, exports, and GDP in deviations from HP trend with
parameter 1600. Source: National Income and Product Accounts.































































Notes: This Figure reports the total real exports (top panel) and real imports (bottom panel), of both goods
and services. Source: National Income and Product Accounts.


































































Notes: This Figure reports the total real exports (top panel) and real imports (bottom panel), of both
durable and non-durable goods. Source: National Income and Product Accounts.

























2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
(b) Imports
Notes: This Figure reports the evolution of nominal and real exports (top panel) and imports (bottom
panel). Both the nominal and real series are normalized to 2005. Source: National Income and Product
Accounts.
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Notes: This gure plots the percentage changes in real imports and exports against the percentage changes
in nominal imports and exports, by EndUse sector, along with a 45-degree line. Source: National Income
and Product Accounts.










1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Simple wedge
Durable wedge
Notes: This gure plots the wedges for total imports and the durable imports. Source: National Income
and Product Accounts and authors' calculations.










1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Consumption wedge
Investment wedge
Notes: This gure plots the wedges for consumption imports and investment imports. Source: National
Income and Product Accounts and authors' calculations.
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(b) Accounts Receivable/Sales
Notes: The top panel of this gure displays the median value of accounts payable/cost of goods sold across
rms in each period. The bottom panel reports the median value of accounts receivable/sales across rms
in each period. Source: Compustat.
38Table A1. Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Independent Variables
Percentage Change in Imports -0.235 0.264 -1.000 0.995
Percentage Change in Exports -0.199 0.238 -0.956 0.965
Downstream Indicators
Average Downstream Use 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.013
Number of Downstream Industries 102 111 1 419
Downstream Herndahl 0.220 0.223 0.009 1.000
Production Sharing (exports) 0.196 0.133 0.005 0.612
Production Sharing (imports) 0.150 0.139 0.000 0.577
Upstream Indicators
Intermediate Use Intensity 0.631 0.122 0.254 0.949
Number of Intermediates Used 113 26 46 218
Herndahl of Intermediate Use 0.094 0.066 0.028 0.532
Trade Credit Indicators
Accounts Payable/Cost of Goods Sold 0.469 0.141 0.194 1.733
Accounts Receivable/Sales 0.532 0.131 0.156 0.817
Compositional Indicators
Percentage Change in Industrial Production -0.180 0.119 -0.836 0.069
Durable dummy 0.588 0.493 0 1
Control Variables
Share in Total Imports 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.088
Share in Total Exports 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.045
Elasticity of Substitution 6.8 10.7 1.2 103
Labor Intensity 0.633 0.229 0.049 0.998
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation. Variable deni-
tions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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Notes: This gure displays the Nominal Eective Exchange Rate and the Real Eective Exchange Rate for
the United States. Source: IMF.
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